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· IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2004 
VIOLA HOGGARD . 
versus 
CITY OF RICH~IOND, VIRGINIA, A MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATION. 
To the J~tdges of the Sttprmne Oottrt of Appeals of Virgin-ia: 
Your petitioner, Viola Hoggard, respectfully shows that 
she is aggTieved by a final judgn1ent rendered against her in 
the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, on the 19th day 
o£ November, 1937, in an action at law lately depending in 
said Court wherein she was plaintiff and the City of Rich-
mond, a 1\iunicipal Corporation, was defendant. A tran-
script of the record of said action accompanying this petition . 
,discloses tpe following case: 
STATE~:[ENT OF THE CASE. 
This is an action by notice of motion for judgroent against 
the said City for $5,000.00 alleged to be due by -reason of in-
juries sustained by the plaintiff when she struck her left hand 
against one of the barbs on a barbed wire fence which the 
said City carelessly and negligently erected and maintained 
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"both under and aboye the water of Shields' Lake, a bathing 
ersort in said City, owned and maintained by the said City, 
to which it invited the plaintiff and other residents and citi-
zens of said City to use as a swhnniing and bathing resort. 
The notice of n1otion also alleges that the City unlawfully 
erected and 1naintained said barbed wire- felice under and 
above the waters of said resort and that the plaintiff's in-
juries were a direct and proximate result of such unlawful 
acts. · 
The City of Riehn1ond demurred to said notice of motion 
on the ground that in maintaining and operating the bathing 
and swimming resort known as Shields' Lake it was engaged 
in the exercise of a governmental function. The trial court 
sustained the said den1u1-rer and dismissed the plaintiff's no-
tice of 1notion, to \vhich action of the Court the plaintiff ex-
cepted. 
ASSIGN:nfENT OF ERROR. 
The petitioner is advised and charges that the trial Court 
erred in sustaining the said demurrer to her notice of motion 
and in dismissi~g her action, on the gTound that such action 
was not authorized by law. 
ARGU:MENT. 
The City's demurrer to the notice of motion raises two 
questions, first, Was the City of Richmond engaged in a gov~ · 
ernmental function in constructing and maintaining a harbed 
wire fence in Shields' Lake, as a part of its activity in operat-
ing its swimming lake, so as to relieve it from liability for in-
juries sustained through its negligence by a person lawfully 
using the lake 1 and, second, Is the City liable, irrespective of 
whether it was acting in a governmental capacity or in its 
proprietary or municipal capacity in operating the lake, for 
unlawfully erecting and maintaining a dangerous barbed wire 
fence in the lake- and thereby causing injury to the plaintiff? 
On the first question the courts of the various States are 
divided, some holding that parks and swimming pools owned 
and maintained by a rnunicipality for public recreatio1~ and 
amusement are- held by it in its governmental capacity and 
that the n1unicipality is therefore not liable for i;njuries re-
sulting from its neg·ligcnce. In other States such places of 
recreation are regarded as private property of the City and it 
is held responsible for injuries arising· from its negligence in 
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the ·operation thereof~ The ques1tion luis not been decided by 
the appellate court of this ~State. · 
In 19 R. C. L., p. 764, Sec. 68, after stating that the ques-
tion whether a system of public parks is owned and operated 
by a municipality in its proprietary or in its governmental 
capacity, is one upon which the authorities are not in agree-
ment, and that on one side it is said that such parks are used 
for public purposes, continues : 
''On the other hand, it is said that the people of the State 
. as a whole have no interest in the parks of a particular City. 
· Primarily, at least, such parks are for the adornment of the 
City and for the pleasure and recreation of its people. While 
visitors may enjoy them freely as a matter of right, yet if 
that bare, intangible right is sufficient to create the puh1ic 
interest of the entire people of the State in these parks, then 
it is difficult to understand what is meant by the purely local 
and private concerns of a city. * * * '' 
Corpus Juris states the subject in this way: 
'' * * * 1\Iunicipal functions are those granted for the spc-
. ci:fic benefit and advantage of the urban community embraced 
within the corporate boundaries. Logically all those are 
strictly municipal functions which specially and peculiarly 
promote the comfort, convenience, safety, and happiness of 
the citizens of the municipality, rather than the welfare of 
the general public"-43 C. J., p. 183, Sec. 179.· 
In 6 McQuillin on l\funicipal Corporations, p. 11-91, Sec. 
2850, this subject is fully treated, and after stating· the di-
versity of opinion prevailing in the courts of the various 
states, and citing· decisions on both sides, the author c]oses 
the section with the following significant statement: 
"In view of the tendency of late decisions and the devel-
opment of the law on this subject, the rule will ultimately 
prevail that in maintaining parks, playgrounds and like 
recreations, the City is performing a local function for its 
people and it should be held liable on the same basis as a 
· private person or corporation.'' 
Under the general law cities of this State may establish 
and conduct a system of public recreation and playgronnds 
(Code 3032b), ''The municipality has a discretion to do or not 
'f 
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to do the work; the duty is,. therefore, judicial up to the time 
that it is determined to do the work; but when the work is 
ordered the law often requires that it be done in a particular 
manner, or that it be not done in a certain way, and, therefore, 
after the work is ordered, the duty of the municipality to do 
the work in the n1anner required and not to do it in the way 
forbidden, is 1ninisterial' '.-~IcQuillin Mun. Corp., Sec. 2799. 
In .Warden v. City of Gt·afton, 99 W.Va. 249, 128 S. E. 375 
(1925 ), plaintiff was injured while playing· on a defective chute 
erected and maintained by the City in a public park owned 
by it. After citing- numerous authorities for the proposition 
that a municipal corporation is liable for neg·ligence· in the 
maintenance of parks and other public enterprises of like 
character, concludes: 
''From the authorities examined and reviewed, there is to 
be observed a distinct n1ovement toward the doctrine that 
municipal corporations are under a duty of exercising rea-
sonable care in the maintenance of parks and other public 
enterprises of like character, which 've think is the more 
wholesome and equitable rule.'' 
The· Supren1e Court of \Vest ·virginia, again on 1\{arch 30, 
1937, reaffirn1ed its stand on the question, in Ashworth v. City 
of Clarksburg, 190 S. E. 764: 
·"vVhatever the law in other jurisdictions, it is the law in 
thi.s State that a 1nunicipality acts as a proprietor in main-
taining a public park. In this capacity, the City must exer~ 
cise ordinary care, and is liable to one injured through a 
breach ·of that duty.'' , 
In Honaman v. City of Philadelphia, 185 Atl. 752 (Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania, June 26, 1936), it is said: 
''While immune from li'ability for negligent conduct . in 
some, though not all, classes of governmental activity (see 
Scibilia v. PhiladeltJhia, sup1·a), this immunity does not fol-
low breach of duty in its ·corporate or proprietary capacity. 
We think the City acts in its corporate or proprietary ca-
pacity in maintaining· its parks. It is then subject to the 
same measure of care in the performance of its duties· and 
obligations arising· out of ownership as any other person in 
possession and control of land.'' (Citing many cases.) 
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In Oity of fVaco v. B1·anch, 5 S. W. 499 (1928), the Com-
missioner of Appeals of Texas states that the authorities 
are divided as to which class of powers and duties the main-
tenance of a public park is referred, and continues: 
"In this State, however, the trend of decision is toward 
what we regard as the ·sounder view that the maintenance of 
a public park by a city is a proprietary function, exercised 
·primarily for the peculiar advantage of the inhabitants of 
the municipality, although members of the general public in-
cidentally become entitled to enjoy the recreational ad-
vantages thus afforded. For this reason, we think that neg-
ligence imputable to the city, with respect to the safety of 
those in lawful use of the park, may furnish ground of lia-
bility for resulting injury. * * * '' 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in City of Sapulpa v. 
' Young, 296 p. 418 (decided in 1931), said : 
''There seem to be as many or more states holding that 
it is the duty of a city owning and operating a public park 
to exercise ordinary care 'to keep the same in a reasonably 
safe condition for the benefit of persons lawfully using the 
same and that, in maintaining its parks, the City is not acting 
in a purely governmental capacity, but in its proprietary or 
private capacity. * * * '' 
And continuing, the Court said: 
"We feel that it would be announcing a very harsh rule 
to hold. that the children of the City of, the public generally 
who play in a city park, for the purposes of pleasure, amuse-
ment, recreation, and inlproving their health, should be in-
vited to a place of danger where they might lose their lives 
or be maimed or injured. When the City invites them into 
its parks for health and recreation, it is the duty of the city 
to use ordinary care in providing them a reasonably safe 
place for such recreation, so we hold that a city must keep its 
public parks in a reasonably safe condition for the bene.fit 
of all persons using them.'' 
· In Glirbas v. City of Sioux Fa.lls, 264 N. W. 197 (decided 
in 1935), the Supreme Court of South Dakota, stated: 
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''This court in }lorberg v. Hagna, 46 S. D. 568, 195 N. W. 
438, 29 A. L. R. 841, held that the n1aintenance of bathing 
facilities in a public park by a city does not constitute the 
exercise of a governmental function within the meani.ng of 
the law that exempts cities from liability for the negligence 
of their officials and en1ployees in the performance of such 
functions and that the defendant city was liable for injuries 
resulting from the placing of a spring-board above tlie sur-
face of shallow water. * * * '' 
It is held in the City of perwer v. Spencer, 34 Colo. 270 
(1905), that: 
"The parks are the private and exclusive property of the 
City, in which the State, as distinguished from the Munici-
pality, has no property interest whatever." 
·Other cases holding that in n1aintaining its parks and other 
places of recreation, cities are not perforllling governmental 
functions, but are acting in their proprietary or private ca-
pacity, include the following: 
"City of Kokomo v. Loy, 185 Ind. 18; Blo01n v. Newa1·k, 
3 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 480; CatJlJ v. St. Louis, 251 Mo. 345; Ehr-
_gott v. New Yo1·k, 96 N. Y. 264; HIeber v. Ha,rrisburg, 216 Pa. 
117; -Barthold v. Philadelphia, 154 Pa. 109; Boise D~velop-
1nent Co. v. Bo·ise City, 30 Idaho 675; Ra1nirez, .Adntr., v. City 
of Cheyenne, 34 \Vyo. 67; Byrnes v. City of Jackson) 140 1\Hss. 
656; Pennell v. H'iln'tington, 7 Pennewill (Del.) 229; lVhite v. 
City of Cha·rlotte, 189 S. E. 493." 
THE CITY'S UNLAWFUL ACT. 
Irrespective of ·whether the City was exercising a govern-
mental or a municipal function it is liable to the plaintiff, 
because her injuries 'vere caused by the unlawful act of the 
City in erecting and maintaining a barbed wire fence in the 
waters of the lake, thereby creating a dangerous situation 
amounting to a nuisance. 
This question is treated in 6 1\t[cQuillin 1\fun. Corp., p. 1191, 
Sec. 2850, where it is said: 
''The rule of exemption based on the governmental func-
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jury is the result of an affhmativ.e act of commission or omis-
sion of the municipality in creating a public nuisance or any . 
essentially dangerous condition, or knowingly permitting such 
nuisance or condition to exist in a public park or other public 
place where it probably will cause injury. The creation or 
sufferance of the nuisance or dangerous condition is not, in 
the light of numerous decisions, an exercise of a governmental 
function. ' ' 
In 43 'C. J., p. 956, Sec. 1734, the same principle of law 
is thus stated: 
""\Vhere a municipal corporation creates or permits a nui-
sance by non-feasance or misfeasance, it is guilty of tort, 
and like a private corporation or individual, and to the same 
extent, is liable for damages in a civil action to any person 
suffering special injury therefron1, irrespective of the ques-
tion of negligence; and such liability cannot be avoided on 
the ground that the n1unicipality was exercising governmental 
powers.'' 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has recently applied 
the law as above expounded. In Whit-e v. City of Charlotte, 
189 S. E. 493, the Court said: 
''Conceding that Independence Park and its facilities, in-
cluding the swing from which plaintiff's intestate fell or was 
thrown with the result that she suffered the injuries from 
which she died, are owned, conti·olled, and operated by the 
defendant in the exercise of a governmental function, and not 
for a corporate purpose (Adki·ns v. Du1·ham, 210 N. C. 134, 
138 S. E. 599), it does not follow as a matter of law that de-
fendants owed rto duty to the plaintiff's intestate, and others 
who had the right to use ~aid facilities for purposes of play 
or recreation, to exercise reasonable care to provide facili-
ties which were reasonably safe, or that defendants would not 
be liable to plaintiff for a breach of such duty, if s1;1ch breach 
was tlie proximate cause of injuries which resulted in the 
death of hiB intestate. (l:i'isher v. New Be·rn, 140 N. C. 506, 
53 S. E. 342, 5 L. R. A. ( N. S.) 542, 111 Am. St. Rep. R57 ; 
Walden v. City of Grafton, 99 W. Va. 249, 128 S. E. 375, 42 
A. L. R. 259.'' 
There are many States holding· that a municipality in op-
erating a swimming pool or park for recreation is engaged in 
a governmental function:and is not liable for injuries caused 
by its negligence to those using the resort, but it is respect-
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fully submitted that those decisions are not based on the 
. ~oundest principles of public policy. The underlying rea-
sons. running through most of such decisions is that to hold 
a municipality liable for its negligence in erecting· and main-
taining such resorts would discourage therr1 in establishing 
places of recreation for their citizens, or would make the mu-
nicipality practically an insurer against injury. 
Is it to the best interest of the public that cities be en-
couraged to erect and maintain resorts without regard to 
their safety and invite '\TOinen and children to use them at their 
peril f or to require the municipality to use reasonable care 
in the operation of such resorts as it may establish and hold 
it liable for injuries caused by its negligence in failing to do 
so. The many decisions of various states holding the mu-
nicipality liable for injuries sustained through their negli-
gence in the management of pleasure resorts, are predicated 
upon the principle that the safety of the public is paramount 
to its pleasure and recreation. 
The governmental functions of the State are primarily 
concerned 'vith the health and safety of the people; and in 
accordance. with that principle this Court has held that the 
removal of garbage by a city is a governmental function (.Ash-
bury v. City of Norfolk, 152 Va. 278). The Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania also held that the collection of ashes and 
rubbish in a city is primarily a health measure, and, there-
fore, a governmental function (Scibilia v. City of Philaclel-
l'hia, 279 Pa. 549), yet when the question of the liability of a 
ntunicipality for negligence in the operating of its park later 
came before the same Cou1~t, it held that the City acted in 
its corporate or proprietary capacity and is subject to the 
same measure of care in the performance of its duties aris-
ing out of ownership as any other person in possession and 
control of land. (Hona1nan v. City of Philadelphia, s~tpra.) 
Many years ago this Court decided that when a city is 
given control over its streets, and is empowered to provide 
ways and means of making and keeping them in repair, the 
law not only imposes it as a duty upon the corporati9n to 
keep its streets in repair, but by implication it hnposes a lia-
bility upon it in the event of its failure to do so. See lvT nble 
v. Richnz.ond, 31 Gratt. 271; Gordon v. Rich·mond, 83 Va. 436. 
In Noble v. RiclMnond, the Court held that notwithstand-
ing the power to open, lay out, and improve streets is a pow·er 
to be exercised for the public benefit, yet it is also a power 
from the exercise of which the city· and its inhabitants de-
rive benefits and advantages not enjoyed by the people of 
the state at large, and where it is authorized to lay out Hnd 
improve streets, and at the same time authorized to raise funds 
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by taxation or assessment to improv:e and repair the same, 
there is imposed upon it a duty to maintain and repair, and 
for its negligence or failure to perform its duty the city will 
be liable in damages for injuries result~ng therefrom. The 
reason for this rule is that such duties are assumed bv the 
city in consideration of the privileges conferred upon ·it by 
its charter . 
. It is submitted that the same reasoning which obtains with 
reference to streets should apply to the maintenance by a 
city of swimming pools for the recreation and pleasure of its 
citizens. 
For the reasons herein set out the petitioner prays that 
she may be granted a writ of error to the judgment afore- · 
said and that the same may be reviewed and reversed. 
Your petitioner states that a copy of this petition was de-
livered to opposing counsel in the trial of this case in· the 
Court below on the 9th day of J\Iay, 1938. 
lVI. HALEY SHELTON, 
'l~IfOS. I. TALLEY, 
.Attorneys for Petitioner. 
VIOLA HOGGARD, 
By Counsel. 
t, Olav Crenshaw, an attorney at law, practicing in the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of ·virginia, do certify that, in my 
opinion, the judg1nent eomplained of in the foregoing peti-
tion should be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia. 
CLAY C·RENSHAW. 
Received 1\1:ay 9, 193S. 
}ff. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
June 1, 1938. \Vrit of error awarded by the Court. Bond 
$300. 
M.B·. W. 
Received June 3, 1938. 
M. B·. W. 
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In the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
Record of the proceedings had before the Court aforesaid, 
in the Court roo1n in the City Hall, on a Notice of Motion 
for Judgment, under the style of Viola Hoggard, Plaintiff, 
v. City of Richmond, Virginia, a :Niunicipal Corporatio~, 
Defendant, wherein an order was entered on Friday, the 
19th day of November, 1937, fro1n which judgment of the 
Court therein contained Notice of Appeal has been given. 
Be It Remember~d that heretofore, to-wit: At a Circuit 
rCourt of the C'ity of Richmond held in the Court rOOlU of the 
.City Hall thereof on 1Ionday, the 1st day of November, 1937, 
the following order was entered: 
·page 2 t Viola lloggard, Plaintiff, 
v. 
City of Richmond; Virginia, a ~{unicipal Corporation, De-
fendant. 
ORDER. 
This day came the Plaintiff herein, by her attorney, and on 
motion of the Plaintiff, by her attorney, this Notice of :N[o-
tion for Judgment is hereby docketed. 
Viola Hoggard, Plaintiff, 
v. 
City of Richmond, Virginia, a M:unicipal Corporation, De-
fendant. 
NOTICE OF :NIOTION FOR JUDG~IENT. 
To: The City of Richmond, Virginia, a 1\riunicipal Corpora-
tion: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTlCE, that I shall on the 1st day of 
November, 1937, at 10 o'clock A. 1\L or as soon thereafter as 
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I may be heard, moYe the Circuit Court of the City of Rich-
mond, Virginia, for a judgment against you in the sum of 
},ive Thousand ($5,000.00) Dollars, for this, to-wit: 
That on and before the 15th day of July, 1937, you owned 
and maintained a bathing· resort known as Shields 
page 3 ~ Lake located in the City of Richmond, Virginia, to 
which you invited me and other residents and citi-
zens of said city to use as a S\vim1ning and bathing· resort, 
and it becan1e and was your duty to erect and maintain said 
- resort in a reasonably safe condition, so as not to injure me 
and other invitees and persons using san1e, but notwithstand-
ing your duty in this behalf, you, carelessly and negligently 
erected and maintained both under and above the wate.r; of 
said resort, at a point designated by you as a safe place for 
me and other a1nateur swimmers to use, a barbed wire fence, 
and which I was bathing at said point in said lake, on the 
15th day of J·uly, 1937, I struck my left hand upon and 
against one of the barbs on said fence which was partly be-
neath the waters of said lake and unseen by me, and severed 
the ligaments of the third finger of said hand where it joined 
the paln1 of n1y hand. 
Fr01n which injuries I was for many days confined to my 
.home under the care of a physician, and was, and still am 
unable to do my usual work and will never to able to use my 
hand as heretofore. I have suffered great mental and phys-
ical pain and anguish, and my hand permanently marred, 
disfigured and injured, all as a direct and proximate result 
of yo1;1r negligence. ' 
I further allege that I gave you written notice, verified by 
affidavit, of the particu]ars of said accident and injuries, 
within sixty clays from date of its occurrence, as provided by 
law, and; 
page 4 ~ That dmnages have been sustained by me in the 
sum of $5,000.00. 
SECOND. 
That on and before the 15th day of July, 1937, you owned 
and maintained a bathing· resort known as Shields Lake, lo-
cated in the City of Richmond, Virginia, to which you in-
vited me and other residents and citizens of said city _to use 
a~ a swimming and bathing· resort, and it became and was 
your duty to erect and maintain said resort in a reasonably 
I·' 
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safe condition and. especially not to erect any dangerous in-
struments in, under and around said resort, at places to be 
used by me and other invitees in swimming and bathing, but 
notwithstanding your duty in this behalf, you unlawfully 
erected and maintained both under and above the waters o~ 
said resort at a point designated by you as a safe place for 
me and other amateur swimmers to use, a barbed wire fence, 
and while I was bathing at said point tn said resort, on the 
15th day of July, 1937, I struck my left hand against one of 
the barbs on said fence which was beneath the water of said 
resort and unseen by 1ne, and severed the ligaments of the 
third finger of said hand where it joined the palm of the 
hand, fro1n which injuries I was for many days confined to 
my home under the care of a physician and was and still am 
unable to do my usual work, and will never be able to use . 
my hand as· heretofore. I have suffered great physical .and 
ntental pain and ang-uish and have been perrna-
page 5 ~ nently marred, dis:fig·ured and injured, all as a direct 
and proximate result of your unlawful acts, and; 
That damages have been sustained by me in the sum of 
$5,000.00, for which judgment will be asked of the Court at 
the time and place herein set forth for the sum aforesaid. 
VIOLA HOGGARD. 
By (Signed) ~I. HALEY SHELTON, 
Counsel. 
And at another day, to-wit: At a Circuit Court of the City 
of Richmond held in the Court room of the City Hall th~reof, 
on Monday, the 8th day of November, 1937. 
page 6 ~ ·viola Hoggard, Plaintiff, 
v. 
City of Richmond, Virg·inia, a },{unicipal Corporation, De-
fendant. 
ORDER. 
This day came the defendant, City of Richmond, by coun-
sel,.and filed its denturrer in writing to the piaintiff's Notice 
of: M~tion for Judgment. 
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Viola Hogg·ard, Plaintiff, 
v. 0 
City of Richmond, 'Virginia, a Municipal Corporation, De-
fendant. 
DE~IURRER. 
The defendant, City of Richmond, demurs to the Notice of 
Motion for Judgment in this action and to each count thereof, 
and says the sanie is not sufficient in law and assigns the fol-
lowin~· ground of demurrer : 
That the said defendant in maintaining and operating the 
bathing and swimming resort known l1S Shield's Lake was en-
gaged . in the exercise of a governmental function. 
JA~1ES E. CANNON, 
City Attorney. 
ClTY OF RICHMOND, 
By Counsel. 
page 7· ~ And at another day, to-wit: At a Circuit Court 
of the ·City of Richmond held in the Court room in 
the City Hall thereof, on Friday, the 19th day of November, 
1937. 
Viola Hoggard, Plaintiff, 
v. 
City of Richmond, ·virginia, a 1\Iunicipal Corporation, De-
fendant. 
ORDER. 
This day came the parties b:y t~eir attorneys and t:4e de-
fendant'~ demurrer to the plaintiff's Notice of Motion fo;r 
tTudgment being argued, it seems to the ·Court that the said 
Notice of J\tfotion and the matters therein contained are not 
sufficient in law for the plaintiff to have and maintain her 
action against the said defendant. 
It is, therefore, considered by the Court that the plain-
tiff take nothing by her Notice and that the defend-
ant go thereof 'vithout day and recover of the plaintiff its 
costs by it about its behalf expended, to which action of the 
Court the plaintiff, by her attorney, excepted. 
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page 8 ~ I, Walker C. Cottrell, Clerk of the Circuit Court 
of the City of Richmond, do hereby certify that the 
foregoing is a true and accurate transcript of all of the record 
in a Notice of ~lotion for Judgment of Vtola Hoggard against 
·City of Richmond, a ~{unicipal Corporation, and I further 
certify that the defendant herein, through its attorney, has 
had due notice of the intention of the plaintiff herein to ap-
ply to this Court for the aforesaid record .. 
Given under my hand the 15th day of February, 1938. 
W ALI(ER C. COTTRELL, Clerk. 
Fee for transcript $3.00. 
A Copy-·Teste : 
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